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The Impact of Corruption on the Timing and Mode of
Entry by U.S. Firms in China
Jacob Billings

I. Introduction

Since 1979 when China opened its economic borders, it has seen an influx of foreign
direct investment that gradually snowballed into enormous annual inflows of capital.
Researchers have taken advantage of this event as an incredibly useful testing ground of theories
regarding FDI. Using this new data from China, along with data from countries already open to
outside investment, many variables, such as GDP, wage, and distance, have been found to
consistently correlate in one way or another to particular aspects ofFDI inflow, including
amount, location, timing, and type.
One such variable that has had some attention is corruption. While it has been well
established that corruption in general is a deterrent to FDI inflows, little else can be confidently
said about its effect on FDI. This paper is an attempt to at least get a sense of what the effect of
corruption might be on two aspects ofFDI: timing and type.
These are both important effects to know about, certainly at least from the standpoint of
governments. If it could be shown that firms are less hesitant to invest, or more willing to
commit high equity type investments when corruption is low, governments, particularly those in
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developing countries that rely on FDI, may be persuaded to make more of an effort to fight
corruption and improve governance.
This paper will describe two models, one measuring the effect of corruption on how
quickly a firm chooses to invest in China, and another measuring the effect of corruption on what
sort of investment the firm makes. The remainder of the paper is divided into four parts: A
survey of previous literature on the subject, a description of the empirical framework (itself
subdivided into parts, discussions of the dependent variables under consideration, the corruption
measures used, the control variables, and the source of data), a report of the empirical results,
and finally the conclusion.
II. Previous Literature
General Determinants of FDI in China
There are four basic aspects to consider under the umbrella ofFDI: amount, mode,
timing, and location. Depending on which paper one reads, the determinants considered have
either significant or insignificant impact, but when there is significance, signs usually agree. For
example, Sun et al (2002) find wages, infrastructure, market demand and size, labor quality and
cost, political risk, openness to outside trade, and under particular time ranges, GDP, to be
important variables, while Quazi (2007) agrees generally, except that significance was not found
for human capital (analog to labor quality) or infrastructure. In particular, Quazi found that
economic freedom has a large impact on FDI inflows to East Asian countries. Another factor
that doesn't seem obvious is the finding by Liu (2008) that Chinese FDI inflow is greater from
countries that are not members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
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Findings for determinants of mode choice are somewhat slim. Chen (2006) found that
firms are more likely to choose greenfield investment when they have a lot of firm-specific
assets (such as knowledge) that may be difficult to transfer to an operation already running.
Attacking the question at a different angle, Shapiro et al (2007) studied whether location
determinants differ by entry mode. Location choice for equity joint ventures were affected
significantly by wage, FDI stock, education, and presence of special economic zones, while
cooperative joint ventures only saw significance from the economic zones, and wholly owned
enterprises saw significance only in FDI stock.
On that note, papers studying locational determinants ofFDI to China are quite common,
and give myriad findings on important variables: proximity to markets and suppliers (Amiti and
Javorcki, 2005), governance quality and corruption (Cole et al, 2009), labor quality, economic
zones, and distance (Gao, 2005), patent certification volume, share of state-owned business,
GDP, wage, and road density (Kawai, 2009). Again, not every study agrees on which variables
are significant, but when they do, the signs are usually the same.
Research on investment timing, at least in China, is even slimmer than that for mode
choice. However, one paper by Raff and Ryan (2008) finds various firm characteristics that
affect investment timing - size, productivity, and R&D intensity were found to be correlated
with a greater eagerness to invest more quickly, while a lack of diversity in a firms product line
is associated with a more conservative approach.
Institutional determinants of FDI

Institutional characteristics ofFDI's host countries is a popular line of inquiry, inquiry
which has confirmed intuitive notions of how "better" institutions should affect FDI. In a more
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general example, Aizenman and Spiegel (2002) analyze an expert survey-based measure of
"institutional efficiency" in its effect on investment composition, and find that the ratio ofFDI to
domestic investment rises with greater efficiency. Similarly, Benassy-Quere et al (2007) find
that "quality of bureaucracy," is an important factor in FDI inflow.
More specific research includes the finding by Fung et al (2005) that market reforms, as
proxied by proportion of state-owned enterprises in the various Chinese provinces, is a more
important determinant, at least in China, ofFDI inflow. Hong's 2008 paper finds that accession
into the World Trade Organization fundamentally changed the way FDI inflows to China were
determined - from high reliance on GDP, university count, and road density, to wage level and
agglomeration.
One interesting paper by Havrylchyk and Poncet (2007) posits that distortions caused by
Chinese policies, in particular state restrictions on credit access and proportion of state-owned
banking, can increase FDI inflow, as such institutions can hamper domestic competition more
severely than foreign competition. The data studied seem to support this position.
Corruption as a determinant

There is almost unanimous agreement in the literature that in the broadest sense,
corruption is a deterrent to foreign investment. Egger and Winner (2006) proposed two opposing
forces of corruption, referred to as "grabbing hand" and "helping hand," which deter and
encourage investment, respectively. Their finding was that the "grabbing hand" overpowered the
"helping hand" and realized an overall deterrence. This general result is agreed upon in all
literature (e.g. Globerman and Shapiro, 2003) that employs corruption as an independent
variable, in addition to the other dimensions of effect corruption has been found to have.
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For instance, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) finds that not only is corruption in general
important, but also the differential in the corruption level between investor country and host
country. Interestingly, it turns out that countries which themselves have high levels of corruption
send relatively more FDI to high-corruption hosts. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) agree with this
result.
In a finer examination specifically on corruption in China, Cole et al (2009) proxy for
anti-corruption efforts in the various provinces of China using number of corruption
investigations per capita. This paper holds the distinction ofbeing one of the only attempts to
study the effect of corruption in China on FDI on the provincial level, and unsurprisingly finds a
positive correlation between anti-corruption efforts and FDI levels. While corruption
investigations may be an unsatisfactory proxy for corruption level, it could easily be argued that
it is the perception of corruption that affects a firm's willingness to invest, and corruption
investigations may have a significant effect on those perceptions.
Straub (2008) attempts to find the difference in effect on FDI between bureaucratic and
political corruption, vis-a-vis their impact on investment through FDI vs. "arm's length"
investment (that is, investment with looser control rights endowed to the investor, like license
agreements). The author finds that bureaucratic corruption favors non-FDI investment, but at a
magnitude that falls off as the level of corruption increases. Meanwhile, political corruption also
favors non-FDI investment, but only very weakly unless interacted with a political risk measure.
Globerman and Shapiro's 2003 paper on how governance and infrastructure affect FDI
perhaps most closely sets precedent for the subject of this paper. It is broader, in that it addresses
not just corruption, but economic openness, government effectiveness, contract enforcement, and
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even origin of legal system in FDI host country. It is also based on a panel of several countries
instead of just China. In another sense it is narrower, as it compares determinants between
industry, but restricts itself to comparing high-tech industry to all other industry, finding that
high-tech industries are more positively affected by work force education level. The study uses a
two stage model; a probit for likelihood of receiving FDI, followed by a regression estimating
determinants on amount ofFDI received. The general finding is that there is a certain threshold
of governance quality below which a host country is unlikely to receive any FDI at all, whereas
countries which have received FDI are more likely to see a greater volume accompanying greater
economic openness and government effectiveness, and lower corruption.
III. Empirical Framework

This section will describe two empirical models. The first model is a standard ordinary
least squares regression to find the correlation between national-level corruption in China and the
timing of investments in the various Chinese provinces by US firms. Specifically the dependent
variable will be the log of days passed between 1980, when China was first open to foreign
investment, and the first investment made in China by the firm represented by a given
observation. The independent variables are, first, a measure of corruption, and then a battery of
provincial variables, firm-level variables, and other control variables.
The second is a probit model intended to measure the correlation between the same
measures of corruption and the likelihood of a firm, which has already decided to invest in
China, to invest in one of four so-called "high-equity" modes of investment, versus one "lowequity" type of investment. The high equity modes are as follows: new plants, acquisitions,
joint ventures, and wholly-owned subsidiaries. Regional sales offices are regarded as low-equity
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investments. Agreements for sales contracts and licensing agreements are also considered lowequity investment, but are not present in the sample.
Timing of Investment

The variable used to measure timing of investment is the log of days passed between
January 1, 1980 and the date ofthe observed investment. The following graph demonstrates the
general shape of investment timing:
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Equity Type

The sample of investment observations contains data on which of six types of investment
occurred: Wholly owned subsidiary, joint venture, new plant, acquisition, or sales office. The
following chart shows the overall distribution of these types in the sample:

Entry Patterns: Mode of Entry

----·-------

This chart only gives a sense of how firms invested within a 25 year period. The next
graph shows the proportion over time of investments that were one of the first four types:
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What Measure of Corruption?

While it must be agreed that corruption, however defined, must have some effect on
economic behavior, deciding to use it as a statistical variable begs the question: how do we
measure it? It seems to me that there are two options facing the researcher. One is to use a
proxy variable, as Cole et al did in their 2009 paper. Their particular method of using number of
corruption cases per capita by province is appealing, but presents problems both theoretical and
practical. Theoretically, there is the problem of whether to consider a high number of cases a
sign of rampant corruption or of a low tolerance of corruption (the paper in question treats it as
the latter).
As an analogy, consider how potential homebuyers might react to a high level of theft
convictions in a particular neighborhood. Perhaps a savvy homebuyer would anticipate
increased property values due to thieves being deterred by the crackdown, but it seems
unreasonable to say confidently that buyers at large would have this reaction.
The other option available is a corruption index. There are at least three such indices
available, all three of which were utilized during this experiment. The three are as follows: The
World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators Project (1996-2005), which includes an index
measuring "control of corruption," Transparency International's corruption perceptions index
(1980-2005), and Political Risk Services Group's quality of government index (1984-2005),
which incorporates a corruption measure.
It is important to note that all three of these indices are based on surveys given to various

experts in economics, politics, and industry, and are thus based on subjective perceptions of
corruption rather than direct, tangible measurements. However, if they do accurately measure
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perceptions of corruption, then they can still be considered useful, as it could be argued that
perceptions of corruption are what drive the behavior of firms considering investing, rather than
the corruption level itself.

Corruption: 1980-2004
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It appears at first glance that the three indices exhibit significantly different

trends. PRSG essentially has no trend, while World Bank has a gentle downward trend, and
Transparency International has a slow downward trend until the mid-90s, when it experiences a
sharp dropoff, followed by somewhat chaotic swings through to the 2000s.
Below is a correlation table for the three indices under consideration:
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As can be seen, noting that all three indices assign a higher score to "better" corruption
levels, the three indices that purport to measure roughly the same thing have poor to strikingly
bad (i.e. incorrectly signed) correlation. At best this means that only one of them is worth
considering, and at worst it means that all three are essentially worthless, at least without more
observations. During the course of the experiment, it became apparent that both the World
Bank's and Political Risk Services Group's indices suffered severe multicollinearity in the equity
type probit, so were dropped in favor ofTransparency International's Index. In the timing of
entry regression, results for all three indices will be presented.
NationaVProvince Level Control Variables
SEZ:

Many previous papers have utilized presence or number of Special Economic

Zones (which in this paper refer also to open coastal cities and free trade zones) as a proxy for
economic openness of a Chinese province. For example, Fung et al found in 2005 that number
of such zones is positively correlated to amount of FDI flowing into a province.
For timing of investment, I formulated the variable as a dummy indicating that the
investment took place within one year of the establishment of an SEZ in the given province. The
sign on this variable may go either way theoretically, but it seems reasonable to say that a firm
which invests only when the institutional business climate improves is one that invests more
cautiously, and thus will wait longer in general to invest. Therefore the predicted sign on this
variable is positive.
For type of investment, I formulated the variable as a dummy simply indicating that at
least one SEZ was present in the province at the time of investment. I predict that SEZ presence
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will encourage firms to make more high-equity investments, so I predict the variable's sign to be
positive.
Education:

This is a standard control variable to proxy for human capital, and is widely

found to have a positive relationship with FDI inflows in general, particularly in Gao's 2005
paper. I predict that education, here formulated as enrollment levels in secondary schools, will
have a negative relationship with timing and a positive relationship with high equity investment.
Highway Density:

This is also a standard control variable, which can proxy for both

infrastructure and ease of commerce. Almost all papers investigating FDI include highway
density or something like it (e.g. rail density) as a control. I predict that highway density will
have a negative correlation with timing, and a positive correlation with high equity investment.
Note that this variable is de-trended for use in the timing model.
Rural Electricity: This variable, which measures consumption of electricity in rural areas

of the provinces, is used as a proxy for infrastructure. This variable has not been used in any
previous literature on FDI in China that I am aware of. I predict that this too will have a negative
correlation with timing and a positive correlation with high equity investment.
GDP per Capita: GDP or GDP per capita is a standard control variable used in virtually

every single empirical analysis ofFDI patterns. It is theoretically linked to greater FDI inflows
and empirically this has been borne out. Likewise I predict that GDP per capita will be
negatively correlated with timing, and positively correlated with high equity investment. Note
that the variable is de-trended for use in the timing model.
Wages: This too is a boilerplate control variable, with higher wages almost always

corresponding to deterred investment. That being the case, I predict wages to be positively
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correlated to timing of investment. Correlation with equity type is a little more difficult to
discern. It may be the case that higher wages (and thus greater disposable income) could attract
more sales offices, while high-equity export oriented firms may be drawn to low wage areas. I
will provisionally predict that wages will be negatively correlated to high equity investment.
Note that the variable is de-trended for use in the timing model.
Firm-Level Control Variables
Size: This variable measures firm size by market cap, and is predicted to be correlated

negatively with timing, and positively with high equity.
Debt: This variable is expected to correlate positively with timing and negatively with

high equity.
Market to Book Ratio: This variable can be seen as a measure of opportunity of

expansion of a firm, as seen by investors. Firms with such opportunity may be considered, all
else equal, to have more opportunity to exercise caution in regard to foreign investment, and will
wait longer to invest in China.
Sales Growth: Similarly to market to book, firms with high sales growth in their current

markets have less incentive to establish a presence in China, all else equal, so this variable is
expected to be positively correlated to timing.
R&D Intensity: This variable is formulated as amount of R&D expenditure scaled by

total sales. Firms with a high R&D intensity have a high level of intangible assets, and as such
will be more cautious about investing in a new market, and in tum investing with high equity.
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Thus the variable is expected to have a positive relation with timing and a negative relation with
high equity.
Advertising Intensity: This variable is formulated as amount of advertising expenditure

scaled by total sales. Firms with high advertising intensity can be said to be highly concerned
with market share, and as such can be expected to hurry to new markets. Thus the variable is
expected to be negatively correlated with timing.
Employee Intensity: This variable is formulated as employment level scaled by total

sales. Even for provinces with high wages relative to the rest of China, wages will still be
significantly lower than those in the U.S. So firms with high employee intensity can be expected
to be eager to set up shop in China, as their costs could be drastically lowered. The variable is
expected to be negatively correlated with timing of investment.
Manufacturing Dummy: This variable is formulated as a one if the given investment for

the observation is classified as manufacturing-related, and zero otherwise (or ifunknown).
Finally, both models include a regional dummy variable and the equity model includes a
year dummy variable to capture unaccounted for macro-economic effects. See Table 1 for a
concise description of variables.
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The Models
The final forms of the models will be as follows, for timing:

+ f3s EMPL; + (39 MFG; + f3to WAGE;

+ f3tt GDP; + f3t2 HIGHWAY;
k;l 9

+ If3k(REGION) + E;
k=l3

Where ToE= Ln (Entry date - Jan 01 , 1980).
And for equity:
MoE;= f3o + f3t CORR; + (32 SIZE;+ (33 DEBT;+ (34 MTBi
+ f3s SALESGR; + (36 R&Di + (37 AD V;
+ f3s EMPL; + (39 ENROLL; + f3to WAGE;

+ f3tt GDP; + f3t2 HIGHWAY;
+ (313 RURALELEC; + f3t4 SEZ;
k=2 l

+

If3k(REGION)
k;l5

k =45

+

If3k(YEAR) + E;
k ; 22

Where MoE = 1 if equity type is joint venture, wholly-owned subsidiary, acquisition, or
new plant, and 0 if it is a sales office.
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Data
All finn-level data comes from INSERT SOURCE HERE via Wooster (2010), who
collected and organized all the observations. All province level data is from China Data Online,
with the exception of SEZ establishment information, which was procured from various internet
sources. Corruption measures are alternatively from the World Bank Governance Indicators
Project, Transparency International, and Political Risk Services Group. Below are tables of the
descriptive statistics:
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Size

423

7.00

1.718

1.447

12.575

Debt

423

0.165

0.163

0

1.159

MTB

423

2.248

2.589

0.132

34.321

Sales Grth

380

0.176

1.183

-0.977

19.460

R&D

423

0.067

0.108

0

0.880

Advertising

423

0.011

0.026

1.80E-9

0.192

Employee

423

0.007

0.006

9.37E-8

0.049

Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

3.858
171.193
90.898
1.372
2.591

1.352
152.314
104.219
0.360
1.202

346

0.578

0.083

0.444 0.722

297

3.768

0.845

2.43

Highway Density(de-trended)
2ndary Schl. Enrollment
Rural Electricity Consumption
Wage (de-trended)
GDP
Ca ita

Transparency Inti.

Min

Max
5.931
633.96
714.25
1.975
5.72

5.13
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IV. Results

The following table reports the results for an OLS regression using 4 models: model (1)
with no corruption variable, model (2) with the PRSG corruption variable, model (3) with the
World Bank variable, and (4) with the Transparency International variable.

(1)

No Corruption
Intercept

7 .821···
(0.239)

N/A

CORR
SIZE
DEBT
MTB
SALESGR
R&D
ADV
EMPL
IDGHWAY
GDPCAP
WAGE
MFG
N
Rz

Model P-Value

-0.006
(0.013)
0.199*
(0.108)
0.011
(0.007)
0.020 ...
(0.005)
o.588 ••
(0.237)
-3 .75···
(1.416)
-10.665 ••
(4.394)
0.015
(0.036)
-0.211 ••
(0.089)
o.935···
(0.194)
-0.046
(0.048)
293
0.4827
<0 .0001

(2)
PRSG
8.155···
(0.292)
-0.382
(0.234)
0.003
(0.009)
0.153*
(0.088)
0 .006
(0 .005)
0 .017 ...
(0.004)
0.386···
(0.148)
-2.328···
(0.867)
-1 1.236···
(4.031)
-0.002
(0.030)
-0.153 ..
(0.076)
0.782···
(0.160)
-0.034
(0.035)
277
0.4997
<0.0001

(3)

(4)

World Bank

Transparency

8.698···
(0.048)
-0.808···
(0.038)
0.002
(0.003)
0.005
(0 .024)
5.6E-4
(0.001)
-0.003···
(0.001)

o.on·

(0.037)
0.033
(0.189)
-1.337"
(0.762)
-5.27E-5
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.011)
0.013
(0.039)
-0.028 ••
(0.013)
144
0.7915
<0.0001

Intl.
9.662···
(0.660)
-0.434···
(0.066)
0 .019
(0.013)
0.012
(0.111)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.009
(0.006)
0.195
(0.163)
-1.585
(1.318)
-3.172
(4.217)
-0.003
(0.035)
-0.078
(0.080)
0.378.
(0.215)
-0.121"*
(0.049)
206
0.6993
<0.0001

It can be seen that the addition of any of the corruption variables improves the correlation

coefficient, and all but PRSG are highly significant as predictors, in the expected negative sign
(lower corruption correlates with less waiting to invest). The PRSG index, while just outside
17

10% significance, edges out the others in stability, with no sign changes for significant variables,
and all significant variables staying significant. In contrast, the introduction of World Bank's
index causes sales growth to switch from positive and significant to negative and significant.
Transparency International's index causes most variables to lose significance, but does not cause
any significant sign switching. The next table reports results for two probit models, one without
any corruption variable and another with Transparency International's index introduced:

No Corruption

Intercept
CORR
SIZE
DEBT

MTB
SALESGR
R&D
ADV
EMPL
SEZ
ENROLL
IDGHWAY
RURALELEC
GDPCAP
WAGE
N
Psuedo-R1
Model P-Value

-1.706
(.)
N/A
0.1696185***
(0.0623969)
-1.039365*
(0.5640707)
-0.0164936
(0.0266875)
0.008426
(0.0589596)
-1.066818
(0.828705)
-11.18272* **
(4.112753)
3.805499
(17.88422)
1.199181 **
(0.5695942)
0.0071481 ***
(0.0024579)
8.32e-06
(7.16e-06)
-0.0036409*
(0.0019674)
0.0001187**
(0.0000595)
-0.0001711
(0.0001108)
27 1
0.2810
<0.0001

-4.970747***
(1.974194)
1.310884***
(0.4606846)
0.132951 *
(0.0735474)
-0.951253
(0.5945325)
-0.0169897
(0.0273052)
0.007944
(0.0585998)
-1.20237
(0.8913863)
-16.42197***
(5.429204)
3.875 12
(19.2791)
1.301215**
(0 .6147238)
0.0082351 **
(0.0033538)
0.00002**
(9 .24e-06)
-0.0050725**
(0.0022724)
0.0002054***
(0.000074)
-0.0002739**
(0.000142)
196
0.2893
0.0003
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In most ways, the results for this model are better than for the timing model. First, not a
single variable flipped signs when adding the corruption variable. This would indicate that our
model is fairly stable. Secondly, the corruption variable is highly significant, and in the direction
we would like it to be (i.e., less corruption encourages high equity investment). Thirdly, the
addition of a corruption variable maintains other variables' significance, and enhancing it in
some cases. It also raises the pseudo-R2 score, though both are quite low. Finally, most included
variables are of expected sign, with the exception of rural electricity consumption, which is both
significant and of the opposite sign as expected.

V. Conclusion

The timing of investment models run in this experiment had mixed results. Adding
corruption variables improved correlation coefficients, but saw some instability of other
variables, which were often of an unexpected sign. Transparency International's corruption
index performed the worst on all counts, while PRSG and World Bank each had greater
measures of success maintaining variable significance and sign stability. In the cases of World
Bank and Transparency International, the corruption variable attained high statistical
significance, with p-scores at or below 0.01. In the case ofPRSG, results were outside
conventional standards of significance, but approached 0.1 0.
Results were much different in the case of the equity type model. While both PRSG and
World Bank's indices were dropped due to multicollinearity, Transparency International's index
not only found high significance in the expected sign, but kept the model stable and slightly
improved significance overall for the control variables. Further, almost all variables were of
their expected signs. The only tarnish on this experiment was a rather low pseudo-R2 of less than
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0.30. Overall I would call the experiment a success and would claim that there is evidence that
lower perceptions of corruption have a positive relationship with a firm's likelihood of
committing FDI as a wholly-owned subsidiary, a joint venture, a new plant, or an acquisition,
rather than a mere sales office.
The usefulness of our corruption indices as they are now cannot be taken for granted.
Certainly the fact that they are so poorly correlated to each other should cast doubt on their
usefulness in the first place. However, due to the marginally positive results for the timing of
entry model, and the generally even better results for the equity model, I remain hopeful about
the prospect of continuing to use the indices for useful empirical results.
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